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When is a Biological Father Really a Dad?
I. INTRODUCTION
"r1ere is a 'clear distinction between a mere biological relation-
ship and an actual relationship of parental responsibility. '"'
In 1993, the nation watched in horror as news reports repeatedly
showed Baby Jessica screaming as she was torn from the parents who
raised her for nearly three years and given to her biological father.2 A
Michigan court allowed Baby Jessica's transfer despite the fact that the
experts who testified concluded that this disruption in her life would
cause great psychological harm to her in the short term and possibly
emotionally scar her for life.' In rendering its decision, the court evalu-
1. Baby Girl K ar rex LK v. B.B., 335 N.W.2d 846, 854 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983)
(quoting Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 259-60 (1983)). In Baby Gir K, the court
upheld the termination of a biological father's rights after determining that his
prebirth actions precluded a finding that he had established a substantial relationship
with his child. Id. at 852-53.
2. See DeBoer v. Schmidt, 501 N.W.2d 193, 194 (Mich. Ct. App.), afd, 502 N.W.
2d 649 (Mich. 1993). Jessica's mother, Cara Clausen, lied about the identity of
Jessica's father on the birth certificate. Id. Both Cara and the named father relin-
quished their parental rights in order to allow the DeBoers to adopt Jessica Id. One
month later, Cara attempted to revoke her release by informing the court that she
had lied about the identity of Jessica's father. Id. Daniel Schmidt, Jessica's biological
father, then filed a petition asserting his parental rights and seeking to intervene in
the adoption. Id. The DeBoers filed a petition to terminate Schmidt's parental rights
on the ground that he abandoned Jessica Id. The court held that there was insuffi-
cient evidence to show that Schmidt had abandoned Jessica and refused to terminate
his parental rights. Id. After a lengthy legal battle, the court took Jessica, then nearly
three years old, away from the DeBoers, who had raised her from birth, and gave
her to the Schmidts. Dianne Hales, What About the Best Interests of the Child?, OMA-
HA WORLD HERALD, Jan. 22, 1994, at 20.
3. See Suellyn Scarnecchia, Defining Family: Adoption Law and Policy Adoption
Rights, 2 DuKE J. GENDER L & POLY 41, 41-42 (1995). Jeree H Pawl, Ph.D., Director
of the Infant-Parent Program at San Francisco General Hospital and an expert on the
case, wrote:
Jessica, in being removed from her current 'parents,' will be transported into
a nightmare and it is one which will never end. The feelings she will experi-
ence cannot be resolved. Perhaps the most compelling way to try to imagine
it is to think of it as a kidnapping. Legally it is certainly not a kidnapping,
but psychologically, that is exactly what it is from the point of view of
Jessica... The most important people in her world upon whom she de-
ated the constitutional rights of the unwed biological father, yet ignored
the rights and interests of the child.4
Unfortunately, this situation frequently occurs: a biological father of a
child born out of wedlock and placed for adoption later asserts a paren-
tal right to his child.' Subsequently, a legal battle ensues which leaves
the child in a state of "prolonged limbo."'
The physiological differences between women and men have natural-
ly led to the granting of varying rights to biological mothers and biologi-
cal fathers.7 While laws throughout the United States are relatively spe-
cific concerning the rights afforded to unwed biological mothers8 *and
to biological fathers marred to biological mothers,9 the laws pertaining
to the rights of unwed biological fathers are vague and uncertain. ° In
pends for everything and for the central understanding of herself and of the
world are missing. This is just the beginning for Jessica. The terror and con-
fusion as to where her 'parents' are and why it Is that they don't come uiU
not be resolved. The yearning, the fear and the sorrow are dreadful and it is
only the beginning.
Id at 47 n.5.
4. See DeBoer, 501 N.W.2d at 194.
5. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text. See generally Michael M. v.
Giovanna F., 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 460 (Ct. App. 1992) (exemplifying the potential diffimcul-
ties involved when a father is not aware of the pregnancy until after the child is
born); In re Kailee "CC", 579 N.Y.S.2d 191 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (depicting the situa-
tion where a father fails to show an interest in parenting the child during the preg-
nancy); In re Adoption of Baby Boy D, 742 P.2d 1059 (Okla. 1987) (upholding the
termination of a father's rights without notice or consent because he assumed no pa-
rental responsibilities and waited until the adoption decree was signed to assert a
parental claim); Baby Girt K, 335 N.W.2d at 846 (representing the predicament aris-
ing when a father is incarcerated during the pregnancy).
6. See generally Images of Adoption-And f CoJion, LA. TIMES, Dec. 25,
1993, at B3 (discussing disanay in adoption laws) [hereinafter Images of Adoption].
7. Baby GirA K, 335 N.W.2d at 854-55 ("The mother carries and bears the child,
and in this sense her parental relationship is clear. The validity of the father's pa-
rental claims must be gauged by other measures.").
8. See generaUlly Kaile -CC", 579 N.Y.S.2d at 192 (describing differences in the
nature of the relationship between an unwed mother and the child and an unwed fa-
ther and the child).
9. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 129-30 (1989) (finding constitutional a
statutory provision establishing a conclusive presumption that the mother's husband
was the child's father).
10. These statutes vary from state to state. Florida, Minnesota, and Wisconsin do
not require an unwed biological father's consent for an adoption if the court deter-
mines that he abandoned the child by failing to provide sufficient support FLA. STAT.
§ 63.032(14) (1993); MIN. STAT. ANN. § 259.24 (West 1992); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.415
(West 1987). Washington allows the termination of the parental rights of an unwed
biological father who was given notice of an adoption, but failed to appear to contest
the adoption. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.33.120(3) (1992). California permits a court to
terminate an unwed biological father's rights if he fails to provide financial assistance
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attempting to clarify the confusion in adoption laws, courts and legisla-
tors have sought to redefine the parental rights of unwed biological
fathers. As a result, legislatures have created classes of parents with
varying rights and responsibilities." Laws typically afford biological fa-
thers not married to the biological mothers fewer rights than biological
fathers married to the biological mothers. The legal dilemma discussed
in this Comment arose from this distinctive treatment of unwed biologi-
cal fathers.
12
Because the rights afforded to these fathers are evolving slowly, there
are no clear guidelines establishing how courts should decide adoption
cases involving fathers' rights."3 This lack of predictability leads fathers
to bring constitutional claims alleging violations of their due process
and equal protection rights.' Jurisdictions decide these underlying
constitutional claims in varying ways, thereby jeopardizing the well-
being of the children involved." In addition to legislative and judicial
recognition of this problem, the harm inflicted on children by the uncer-
tain results in these adoption situations has also led to public demand
for reform."8 Hence, many groups have formed specifically to lobby for
to the child for one year or fails to communicate with the child for one year. CAL
FABL CODE § 8704 (West 1996).
11. See generally UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 2-401 (1994), 9 U.LA. 27 (Supp. 1996)
(creating three classes of parents: mothers, fathers who are presumed fathers, and
fathers who are not presumed fathers). Mothers and fathers who are presumed fa-
thers have the right to withhold consent to any proposed adoption. Id. On the other
hand, fathers who are not presumed fathers cannot block an adoption unless they
prove that the adoption is not in the best interests of the child. Id; see infia note
89 (providing text of § 2-401 of the Uniform Adoption Act).
12. The legal term used to address a father who is not married to the biological
mother of his child is "unwed biological father." Because the focus of this Comment
is on the rights of unwed biological fathers, the author refers to these fathers only
as "fathers" unless further clarification is necessary.
13. See supra note 10 for a brief example of jurisdictional variations of rights
granted to unwed biological fathers.
14. See inftu notes 53-107 and accompanying text (examining various constitutional
claims by fathers).
15. See inftra note 36 and accompanying text (quoting expert opinion on effects of
these legal processes on children).
16. For example, in response to public outrage over the traumatic transfer of Baby
Jessica, a group formed the Hear My Voice organization (formerly The DeBoer Com-
mittee for Children's Rights). The mission statement of this organization is "to pro-
mote the right of children to have safe, permanent families." Implementing Our Mis-
sion Through Increasing Advocacy in 1996, HEAR MY VOICE (Hear My Voice, Ann
Arbor, MI) Winter 1996, at 1. The organization advocates "changing the system that is
the enactment of protective legislation that will require consideration of
the children's interests.7
This Comment focuses on the origin of recent legislative, judicial, and
public support for clarification in this area, particularly the impasse
arising when an unwed biological father attempts to block an adoption
and the effects on children of the lack of a uniform standard to deter-
mine a father's rights. Part II of this Comment discusses the historical
development of the problem, focusing specifically on the urgent need to
establish uniformity and predictability in determining a father's rights,
and the effect of the current confusion on the children involved." Part
Ill outlines the underlying constitutional claims emanating from these
cases because neither state statute nor judicial precedent addresses the
rights afforded to unwed biological fathers with any degree of uniformi-
ty." Part IV proposes guidelines to provide predictability in light of the
constitutional issues, particularly the need for state enactment of cer-
tain sections of the Uniform Adoption Act, along with other specific
legislation, and the possibility of recognizing constitutionally protected
due process rights for children?1 Part V concludes that state ratifica-
tion of pertinent sections of the Uniform Adoption Act, or adoption of
similar specific guidelines, will provide the certainty necessary to pro-
tect the rights of all parties to an adoption-the biological parents, the
potential adoptive parents, and most importantly, the child.2 Part V
further concludes that consistent court recognition of constitutional due
process rights for children will serve as a safety net to protect the inter-
ests of children who may inevitably fall through the cracks of even the
most specifically drafted guidelines.'
U. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Historically, a grave stigma attached to an illegitimate child.' Conse-
quently, the law protected only legitimate children.24 Fathers had no
obligation to provide either support or inheritance opportunities to their
illegitimate children?' In the late twentieth century, however, the stig-
failing our children" Id, at 2.
17. See id,
18. See infm notes 23-52 and accompanying text.
19. See itura notes 53-167 and accompanying text.
20. See intfra notes 168-220 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 221-25 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 221-25 and accompanying text.
23. Mary Kay Kisthardt, Of Fatherhood, Families and Fantasy: The Legacy of Mi-
chael H. v. Gerald D., 65 TuL L REV. 585, 588 (1991). In medieval times, illegitimate
children were unable to inherit property or obtain support from their parents. Id
24. Id.
25. Id.
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ma of illegitimacy began to diminish.26 In recognition of the changing
attitudes towards illegitimacy, Texas, for example, ' recently deleted the
word "illegitimate" from its statutes.' The recent changes in attitudes
toward children born out of wedlock work to extinguish the original
rationale for differential treatment of their fathers, namely the previous
lack of legal rights for children born out of wedlock.2 Consequently,
courts now grant illegitimate children privileges that they were previ-
ously denied' and impose responsibilities upon their biological fa-
thers.'
Similarly, courts now recognize that they should not deny a father the
opportunity to care for a child solely because he is not married to the
biological mother."' Yet, great uncertainty exists as to when a father
26. See generally Harry D. Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 Mic.
L PEv. 477 (1967) (discussing general changes in legislation disfavoring illegitimate
children in the areas of support, inheritance, custody, visitation, adoption, father's
names, and state and federal welfare benefits); Comment, The Emerging Constitution-
al Protection qf the Putative Fathers Parental Right, 70 MIC. L REV. 1581 (1972)
(analyzing the constitutional implications of laws dealing with illegitimate children and
providing a survey of state laws illustrating the nature and scope of the discrimina-
tion against unwed biological fathers).
27. In re J.W.T., 872 S.W.2d 189, 194 (Te. 1994) (noting that because "[m]ore than
one quarter of the children in this country are born to unmarried mothers," the nega-
tive connotations associated with the word "illegitimate" warranted replacement of the
word in the statutes).
28. See generally Paul Knisely & Broadus Spivey, Paternity Determinations in
Texas: Five Years Under Chapter 13 of the Texas Family Code, 20 S. TEL. LJ. 465,
487 (1979) (presenting historical progression of "children who, through no fault of
their own, are born into the uncertain legal status of illegitimacy"); Ernest E. Smith,
Illegitimate Children and Their Fathers: Some Problems with Title 2, 5 TEx TEci.
L REv. 613, 614 (1974) (arguing that, in Texas, "statutory treatment of illegitimate
children and fathers of illegitimate children ... is at best confusing and at worst
unconstitutional*).
29. Illegitimate children are now entitled to financial support from their biological
fathers. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973). They are also entitled to paternal
inheritance. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 772 (1977). Furthermore, illegitimate
children are allowed to collect from wrongful death or worker's compensation claims
for the death of their fathers. See Thompson v. Vestal Lumber & Mfg. Co., 22 So. 2d
842, 848 (La. 1945).
30. See Gomez, 409 U.S. at 538; see also Mary L Shanley, Unwed Fathers' Rights,
Adoption, and Sex Equality: Gender-Neutrality and the Perpetuation of Patriarchy,
95 COLUM. L. REv. 60, 66-70 (1995) (presenting an overview of the common law's
stance toward a father's rights and obligations to his illegitimate children).
31. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972) (finding a statute declaring children
of unmarried fathers dependents of the state a violation of constitutional rights).
has the right to block the adoption of his child.3 This uncertainty
leads to heartache when a court reverses a lower court's order and
allows for a change in custody of a child now three or four years old.
This situation must, therefore, be handled with urgency to minimize any
resulting harm to the child involved.
A. Urgency of the Issue
Children are not static objects. They grow and develop, and their growth and de-
velopment require more than day-to-day satisfaction of their physical needs. Their
growth and development also require day-to-day satisfaction of their emotional
needs, and a primary emotional need is for permanence and stability.'
Children are not propertye for a court to award to the winner of a
legal battle.' Because of the complex nature of a child's development,
this area of the law needs clear resolution. While parents litigate the
future placement of a child, the child passes through several develop-
mental stages and forms attachments to caregivers.' The early years are
32. See generally Susan Swingle, Comment, Rights of Unwed Fathers and the Best
Interests of the Child: Can These Competing Interests Be Harmonized? Illinois' Pu-
tative Father Registry Provides an Answer, 26 LoY. U. Ci. LJ. 703 (1995) (discuss-
ing the uncertainty existing in current adoption laws pertaining to unwed biological
fathers); Karen C. Wehner, Comment, Daddy Wants Rights Too: A Perspective on
Adoption Statutes, 31 Hous. L REv. 691 (1994) (same); Tonya X. Zdon, Comment,
Putative Fathers' Rights: Striking the Right Balance in Adoption Laws, 20 WM.
MrrCHELL L REV. 929 (1994) (same).
33. In re Adoption of Baby Boy D, 742 P.2d 1059, 1067 (Okla. 1987) (terminating
father's parental rights because he did not demonstrate parental responsibility for his
child before the child was placed for adoption).
34. Historically, however, children belonged to their fathers who "actually owned
their children as if they held title to themn." Nancy Ellen Yaffe, A Fathers' Rights
Perspective on Custody Law in California: Would You Believe It if I Told You That
the Law Is Fair to Fathers?, 4 S. CAL INTERDIsCuNAmY LJ. 135, 137 (1995).
35. Children Aren't Property to be Toyed with, BUFFALO NEWS, Nov. 18, 1993, at 2
(arguing that children are not owned by parents; rather, parents are given the "privi-
lege" of sharing in the joy of the lives of their children).
36. See JOSEPH GoLDSTFJ gr AL, BEYOND THE BEsT INTERESTS OF THE CiLD 32-33
(1973).
Change of the caretaking person for infants and toddlers further affects the
course of their emotional development Their attachments, at these ages, are
thoroughly upset by separations as they are effectively promoted by the con-
stant, uninterrupted presence and attention of a familiar adult. When infants
and young children find themselves abandoned by the parent, they not only
suffer separation distress and anxiety but also setbacks in the quality of their
next attachments, which will be less trustful. Where continuity of such rela-
tionships is interrupted more than once, as happens due to multiple place-
ments in the early years, the children's emotional attachments become in-
creasingiy shallow and indiscriminate.
Id.
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a crucial time in the life of a child because they shape a child's entire
existence.7 Thus, early stability is not only important, but mandatory, to
a child's well-being.' When there is a custody dispute it must be han-
dled with great swiftness to avoid psychological damage to the child.'
A custody dispute leading to the relocation of a child to a new home
with new caregivers shakes the child's stability.* This problem is
heightened when the dispute is between an unwed biological fa-
ther-who likely asserted his parental rights after the child was placed
with caregivers-and the prospective adoptive parents." The litigation
process of a custody dispute places a child in a state of flux that ulti-
mately damages a child's development.' The child must not be the one
suffering as a result of any delay in determining placement.' The courts
must protect a child's constitutional right to a stable family life."
Additionally, many public policy reasons demand an early resolution of
the rights of the parties involved in a child's life. First, an unwed biologi-
cal mother faces many important decisions early in her pregnancy, in-
cluding whether to terminate the pregnancy, plan for adoption, or keep
her baby.* Thus, it is important that the father immediately make his
position regarding the child's future known to the mother so that she
may use this information to make her decisions.' Second, the mother
37. Id. at 32-34.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 43.
40. Sider v. Sider, 639 A.2d 1076, 1086 (Md. 1994) (recognizing the importance of
considering "the possible emotional effect on the child of a change of custody").
41. See, e.g., Adoption of Michael H., 898 P.2d 891 (Cal. 1995) (exemplifying poten-
tial length of time involved in an adoption contested by an unwed biological father),
cert. denied sub nor., Mark v. Johns, 116 S. Ct. 1272 (1996). In Michael H., an un-
wed biological father asserted his desire to care for his child after the child was
placed with prospective adoptive parents. Id. at 893. The trial court terminated the
father's rights; the court of appeal, however, reversed and determined that the father
had a right to raise the child. Id, at 893-94. By the time the California Supreme
Court ultimately reversed the lower court's decision and found that the father's inter-
ests were not worthy of constitutional protection, the child was four and one-half
years old Id. at 901.
42. See Painter v. Bannister, 140 N.W.2d 152, 158 (Iowa 1966) (awarding custody to
adoptive parents because disrupting the child at a late stage in development would
"gamble with [the] child's future").
43. GOLDSTEiN ET AL, supra note 36, at 45.
44. For an argument in favor of judicial recognition of a child's constitutional right
to due process review prior to removal from the child's existing home, see infra
notes 198-220 and accompanying text.
45. Michael H., 898 P.2d at 898.
46. Id, This Comment does not specifically address the situation arising when an
needs medical, emotional, and financial support during her pregnancy. 7
Therefore, it is essential that she know early in her pregnancy whether
she will be able to rely on the father's support.' Finally, the risk of a
father legally asserting his parental rights after the court places a child
with adoptive parents will dissuade potential adoptive parents from
adopting.
Hence, all parties involved in an adoption need to know as soon as
possible what role an unwed biological father will take in his child's life.
All parties suffer tragically when a higher court overrules a lower court's
decision not to protect a father's constitutional rights and reverses the
lower court's award of custody to adoptive parents.' Thus, the very na-
ture of this issue mandates the establishment of clear and distinct
guidelines that specify the procedures and time limits involved in the
adoption of a child. Such guidelines will provide the certainty necessary
to protect children and provide the stability necessary for their devel-
opment and growth."' Furthermore, as a safety precaution above and
beyond establishing clear guidelines, courts must recognize a child's right
to due process prior to removing the child from an existing home.'
Il. LEGAL ISSUES
The intangible fibers that connect parent and child have infinite variety. They are
woven throughout the fabric of our society, providing it with strength, beauty, and
flexibility. It is self-evident that they are sufficiently vital to merit constitutional
protection in apprpriate cases."
While states generally regulate adoption, federal precedent is important
because the unpredictability as to when a state court will terminate an
unwed biological father's rights usually leads to two constitutional
claims: (1) violation of due process, and (2) violation of equal protection
under the laws." In deciding these issues, courts generally draw a dis-
tinction between a protected constitutional interest and an interest that
unwed biological father Is unaware of the pregnancy. Nevertheless, the proposals rec-
ommended in this Comment apply equally to that situation. See iftyf notes 168-220
and accompanying text (outlining recommended proposals).
47. Michael H., 898 P.2d at 898.
48. Id
49. Id,
50. GOLDSTEmIN T AL., supra note 36, at 32-34 (discussing the dangers to a child's
development and to the parent-child relationship when attachments are disrupted).
51. Id.
52. See inffu notes 198-220 and accompanying text (arguing the need for proposals
to protect due process rights of children).
53. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 256 (1983) (emphasis added).
,54. See infa notes 64-107 and accompanying text (discussing due process and
equal protection challenges to termination of a father's parental rights).
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is "merely inchoate"" and therefore has not ripened into an interest
worthy of constitutional protection.' The United States Supreme Court
has recognized that a father's constitutional right to raise his child is not
absolute67 by holding that a father's relationship with his child is en-
titled to constitutional protection only after he establishes a substantial
and committed relationship with his child.' The Court has noted that
"'[p]arental rights do not spring full-blown from the biological connection
between parent and child. They require relationships more enduring.'"'
The due process and equal protection arguments are important to
unwed biological fathers because they provide the usual grounds upon
which these fathers challenge the unpredictable tests applied by state
courts.' The most standards frequently applied by state courts in deter-
mining whether they will terminate an unwed biological father's rights
55. There is a distinction between an inchoate, or incomplete right to parent a
child, and the constitutional importance afforded to a fully developed parent-child
relationship. John T. Wright, Comment, Caban v. Mohammed- Extending the Rights of
Unwed Fathers, 46 BROx L REv. 95, 115-16 (1979) ("[Tihe unwed father's interest
springs not from his biological tie with his illegitimate child, but rather, from the
relationship he has established with and the responsibility he has shouldered for his
child.).
56. See, e.g., Adoption of Michael K, 898 P.2d 891, 896 (Cal 1995) (citing Lehr,
463 U.S. at 261-63), cert. denied sub norn, Mark v. Johns, 116 S. Ct 1272 (1996).
57. See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 265 (finding that a father's due process rights were not
violated when he was not given notice of the adoption proceedings because he had
not established a substantial relationship with his child); Caban v. Mohammed, 441
U.S. 380, 394 (1979) (allowing a father to attempt to block adoption by third parties
because he had an existing relationship with his child worthy of constitutional pro-
tection); see also In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W., 647 So. 2d 918, 923 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1994) (holding that a father "must take some positive action to assume the
responsibilities of parenthood before he becomes entitled to exercise the rights of
parenthood"), affd, 658 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 1995), crt. denied sub nom, G.W.B. v.
J.S.W., 116 S. Ct 719 (1996).
58. See, e.g., Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262 (noting that father did not "grasp[] [the] oppor-
tunity" to develop a relationship with his child because he waited until after the
adoption petition was filed to attempt to assert his parental rights); Caban, 441 U.S.
at 389, 393 (holding that father not only demonstrated a commitment to a rela-
tionship with his children, but also that a substantial relationship existed between the
father and his children because he lived with the unwed biological mother and the
children for several years).
59. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 260 (quoting Caban, 441 U.S. at 397 (Stewart, J., dissenting)
(emphasis omitted)).60. See inlfra notes 64-107 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional argu-
ments raised by unwed biological fathers).
are: (1) whether his actions constitute abandonment of the child,6' (2)
whether it is in the best interests of the child that the father's parental
rights be terminated,' and (3) whether the nature of the relationship be-
tween the father and his child is worthy of constitutional protection.6
A. Due Process of Law
The significance of the biological connection is that it offers the natural father an
opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his off-
spring. If he grasps that opportunity and accepts some measure of responsibility
for the child's future, he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child relationship
and make uniquely valuable contributions to the child's development '
Many fathers argue that the termination of their parental rights violates
their constitutional right to due process.' Due process, however, does
not mandate a hearing "in every conceivable case of government impair-
ment of private interest";6 rather, the governmental interest advanced
by regulation of the private interest must be balanced against the impor-
tance of the private interest.67
Courts have consistently held that there is a presumptive preference
for biological parents to assume the custody and care of children and
61. See ifrts notes 108-32 and accompanying text.
62. See qfta notes 133-56 and accompanying text
63. See frat notes 157-67 and accompanying text
64. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262.
65. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that a
person will be free from governmental interference with fundamental constitutional
rights absent some compelling reason for interference. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The
Fourteenth Amendment further guarantees that no such compelling governmental in-
terference will be allowed absent *due process." Id.
Due Process demands notice and an opportunity to be heard before a person
may be denied a substantial interest Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S.
18, 25 (1981). Once a court identifies the private interest, it may determine whether
or not the state has a substantial reason for denying the private interest. Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 483 (1972). See generaUly Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972) (finding father's due process rights violated when his children were taken from
him without a hearing to determine his fitness as a parent); Michael M. v. Giovanna
F., 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 460 (Ct. App. 1992) (holding father's due process rights violated
when court denied him standing to assert paternity); In re J.W.T., 872 S.W.2d 189
('rex. 1994) (holding that statute barring an opportunity for a hearing to establish pa-
rental rights denied father due process).
66. Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 894-95 (1961)
(explaining that "the very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible
procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation" and finding that "what
procedures due process may require under any given set of circumstances must begin
with a determination of the precise nature of the governmental function involved as
well as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental action").
67. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 256.
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that the state must show a sufficient cause for any intervention with this
presumption. In the case of illegitimate children, states have an inter-
est in placing children in stable homes while fathers have an interest in
parenting their children.6' Federal and state laws have attempted to bal-
ance these competing interests, and courts have held that a state does
not violate a father's right to due process if it shows a compelling reason
to terminate his parental rights.'m In fact, the Supreme Court has ruled
that a state must only afford a father due process protection of his inter-
est in having contact with his child when he has "demonstrate[d] a full
commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood."71
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
clearly articulated this standard in Pena v. Mattox. 72 In Pena, the father
(Ruben) argued that his due process rights were violated when his paren-
tal rights were terminated by the adoption of his child.' The mother
(Amanda) gave birth to the child while Ruben was in jail for statutory
rape.74 As part of his sentence, the court ordered Ruben not to have any
contact with Amanda or her family.' Furthermore, Pena was not in-
formed of the birth of the child and did not consent to the adoption of
the child.78 The court nevertheless held that Ruben's due process rights
were not violated when the child was adopted without his consent.'
68. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978); see also Adoption of Kelsey S.,
823 P.2d 1216, 1236 (Cal. 1992); Baby Girl K ex 7el LK v. B.B., 335 N.W.2d 846,
855 (Wis. 1983).
69. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651.
70. See id. at 650. In Stanley, the Court held that an linois statute presumptively
declaring an unwed biological father an unfit parent violated the father's due process
rights. Id. at 656.
71. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261 (citing Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392 (1979)).
72. 880 F. Supp. 567 (N.D. IlL 1995).'
73. Id at 570.
74. Id. at 569. Amanda was 15 years old, and Pena 19 years old, when Amanda
became pregnant Id.
75. Id,
76. Id,
77. Id. at 573-74. Pena provides an excellent illustration of the harsh results often
reached in these cases. Ruben was in jail and the criminal court ordered him not to
have any contact with the biological mother. Id, at 569. Nevertheless, the adoption
court terminated Ruben's parental rights on the grounds that Ruben failed to estab-
lish a relationship with his child worthy of constitutional protection. Id, at 574. Under
the guidelines of the Uniform Adoption Act, the basis for termination of Ruben's pa-
rental rights would probably have been stringent enough to protect Ruben's interests
See itfra notes 173-91 and accompanying text (discussing guidelines provided by the
Uniform Adoption Act).
The court reasoned that because Ruben failed to take advantage of steps
available to him to form a relationship with his child,18 "he lost the won-
drous opportunity and massive responsibilities of fatherhood." '
Thus, if a father fails to develop a substantial relationship with his
child, due process does not demand a hearing prior to the termination of
his parental rights. Absent from this due process analysis, however, is
due process protection for the child involved.1 To fully provide consti-
tutional protection, the courts must also recognize the due process rights
of the child, who deserves protection from disruption in his or her life,
liberty, and pursuit of happiness."' In addition to due process, many fa-
thers claim that termination of their parental rights results in a violation
of their rights under the Equal Protection Clause.'
B. Equal Protection Clause
"Gender-based distinctions 'must serve important governmental objec-
tives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives' in order to withstand judicial scrutiny under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause."'
The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause' establishes
constitutionally protected categories by which a state may not distin-
guish parties absent a legitimate governmental objective.' Furthermore,
78. Pena, 880 F. Supp. at 574. The court found that Ruben could have either (1)
initiated a paternity suit as soon as he was aware of Amanda's pregnancy, or (2)
initiated an action to obtain a judgment establishing his parental rights Id. at 572.
79. Id. at 574.
80. See infrn notes 198-220 and accompanying text (advocating adoption of propos-
als to protect children's due process rights).
81. The Fourteenth Amendment protects aU persons from interference with their
life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness absent a sufficient state interest for such inter-
vention. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
82. See infm notes 83-107 and accompanying text
83. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 388 (1979) (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190, 197 (1976)).
84. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires that
states afford similar treatment to persons similarly situated. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
See generally Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 267-68 (1983) (holding that the Four-
teenth Amendment is not violated when a father fails to establish a substantial rela-
tionship with children and is then denied notice of adoption); Caban, 441 U.S. at 394
(holding that sex-based distinction in adoption law violated Fourteenth Amendment).
85. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (holding that statute favoring
males over females in appointing estate administrators violated the Equal Protection
Clause because the state had no substantial state interest in distinction); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967) (holding that a statute prohibiting interracial mariage
was violative of equal protection because it drew distinctions based solely on race);
Adoption of Kelsey S., 823 P.2d 1216, 1237 (Cal. 1992) (finding that statute providing
for gender-based distinctions between a biological mother and an unwed biological
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the means that the state employs tb differentiate between parties must
substantially serve the specified governmental objective.' Because gen-
der is one of the protected categories, unwed biological fathers argue
that gender-based parental classifications that afford them fewer rights
than unwed biological mothers violate the Equal Protection Clause be-
cause the classifications are based on irrelevant differences.
In the attempted adoption of an illegitimate child, the state's interest is
"to promote the best interests of the child, to protect the rights of inter-
ested third parties, and to ensure promptness and finality."' Conse-
quently, state statutes generally entitle mothers of illegitimate children to
always block a proposed adoption, but afford fathers of illegitimate chil-
dren this opportunity only upon a showing of a substantial relationship
between the father and the child.' Courts allow application of these
father violated the Equal Protection Clause).
86. See, e.g., Reed, 404 U.S. at 76; Loving, 388 U.S. at 11; Kdsey S., 823 P.2d at
1233.
87. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 255.
88. Id. at 266.
89. See UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 2-401 (1994), 9 U.LA. 27 (Supp. 1996) (allowing
unwed biological mothers to unconditionally withhold consent to an adoption, but
allowing unwed biological fathers to only withhold consent when they have exhibited
'parenting behavior").
Section 2-401 lists the persons whose consent is required in order to complete
an adoption:
(1) mhe woman who gave birth to the minor and the man, if any,
who:
(i) is or has been married to the woman if the minor was born dur-
ing the marriage or within 300 days after the marriage was terminated or a
court issued a decree of separation;
(ii) attempted to marry the woman before the minor's birth by a mar-
riage solemnized in apparent compliance with law, although the attempted
marriage is or could be declared invalid, if the minor was born during the
attempted marriage or within 300 days after the attempted marriage was
terminated
(iii) has been judicially determined to be the father of the minor, or
has signed a document that has the effect of establishing his parentage of
the minor, and:-
(A) has provided, in accordance with his financial means,
reasonable and consistent payments for the support of the minor and has vis-
ited or communicated with the minor, or
(B) after the minor's birth, but before the minor's place-
ment for adoption, has married the woman who gave birth to the minor or
attempted to marry her by a marriage solemnized in apparent compliance
with law, although the attempted marriage is or could be declared invalid; or
gender-based distinctions to fathers who do not accept the responsibility
necessary to establish a relationship with their children.
For example, in Lehr v. Robertson,' an unwed biological father
(Lehr) claimed that New York's gender-based distinctions for parental
classes denied him equal protection. 1 Eight months after his child was
born, the biological mother married another man.' Two years later, the
mother and her husband filed for adoption of the child.' One month
after the adoption proceeding began, Lehr filed a petition seeking visita-
tion and paternal rights.9 The court dismissed the petition and ultimate-
ly granted the adoption.' Lehr argued that he was denied equal protec-
tion because his consent was not required for the adoption whereas a
similarly situated biological mother's consent would have been neces-
sary.' Reasoning that equal protection only applied to cases where the
mother and father are "similarly situated with regard to their relation-
ship with the child," the Supreme Court held that Lehr had no valid
claim.' Because the biological mother had an established relationship
with the child but Lehr did not, the Court reasoned that the Equal Pro-
tection Clause did not prevent the state from affording varying rights to
the two parents."
Conversely, in Stanley v. ///inoise the Court found that an minois
gender-based statute did violate a father's equal protection rights." The
unwed biological father (Stanley) claimed that the state denied him equal
protection because he was not afforded a hearing to determine his fit-
(iv) has received the minor into his home and openly held out the
minor as his child;
(2) the minor's guardian if expressly authorized by a court to consent
to the minor's adoption; or
(3) the current adoptive or other legally recognized mother and father
of the minor.
Id.
90. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
91. Id at 266. Sections 111 and 1lla of the New York Domestic Relations Law
contained gender-based distinctions and guaranteed certain parental classes the op-
portunity to block an adoption. ld. Although the laws did not restrict this opportunity
for the biological mother, they granted the biological father the opportunity only in
certain circumstances. Id,
92. Id at 250.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 252.
95. Id at 253.
96. Id. at 255.
97. Id, at 267 (emphasis added).
98. Id. at 267-68.
99. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
100. Id. at 657-58.
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ness as a parent before his parental rights were terminated." Stanley
lived sporadically with the biological mother and their three children for
eighteen years."° When the biological mother died, the children became
wards of the state pursuant to Illinois law." The Supreme Court held
that the statute violated Stanley's constitutional rights because his chil-
dren were taken from him without a determination that he was an unfit
parent"0 ' The Court reasoned that because Stanley established a sub-
stantial relationship with his children, the denial of his parental rights
under a state statute that declared only those children of unmarried
fathers wards of the state without affording the fathers any type of hear-
ing directly violated Stanley's equal protection rights.1"
Therefore, courts have typically allowed states to apply gender-based
distinctions to classes of parents not similarly situated, particularly un-
wed biological fathers who have not established a relationship with their
child (as in Lehr), but they have not allowed states to apply such distinc-
tions to similarly situated individuals (as in Stanley).
In sum, the case law in this area establishes the principle that neither
due process nor equal protection rights are violated when an unwed
biological father loses his parental rights after he fails to commit to or
establish a substantial relationship with his child." The determination
of whether a father committed to or established a relationship with his
101. Id. at 64647.
102. Id. at 646.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 657-68.
105. Id. at 658. The Court found that the state's convenience in presuming an un-
wed biological father unfit was "insufficient to justify refusing a father a hearing
when the issue at stake is the dismemberment of his family." Id. The Court also
found that "denying such a hearing to Stanley and those like him while granting it to
other Illinois parents is inescapably contrary to the Equal Protection Clause." Id,
Furthermore, the Court held that termination of Stanley's rights violated due process.
Id. See supra notes 64-82 and accompanying text for a discussion of due process
claims.
106. See generally Lehr v. Robinson, 463 U.S. 248, 267-68 (1983) (finding that father
failed to take available steps to establish a relationship with his child); Caban v.
Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979) (holding that father's rights were entitled to
constitutional protection because he lived with the children as their father and con-
tributed to their financial support); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255-56 (1978)
(allowing the termination of father's rights because he "never shouldered any signifi-
cant responsibility for the child's rearing"); Stanley, 405 U.S. at 657-58 (ruling that
father's rights were entitled to constitutional protection because he lived intermittently
with his children for 18 years).
child worthy of constitutional protection is a fact-sensitive issue. Conse-
quently, states vary greatly in the procedures they employ to make the
initial determination of the rights afforded an unwed biological father,
and these determinations ultimately lead to the due process and equal
protection claims outlined above.'O
C. State Procedures Determining the Rights of Unwed Fathers
1. Abandonment
Several states allow termination of an unwed biological father's rights
upon a showing that the father has "abandoned" the child."
In the seminal adoption case in Florida, Doe v. Roe," an unwed bio-
logical father (Richard) claimed that the court violated his constitutional
rights when it permitted the adoption of his child without his con-
sent 1 0 Upon learning of the mother's pregnancy, Richard urged the un-
wed biological mother (Mary) to have an abortion because he "was not
ready to commit to marriage, felt financial pressure, and was troubled by
the whole idea of marriage.""' After the child was born and two days
after Mary signed the adoption agreement, Richard proposed marriage to
Mary and explained that he wanted to keep the baby."' The trial court
applied a Florida statute and determined that Richard abandoned the
child and therefore his consent to the adoption was not necessary."
The Supreme Court of Florida upheld the trial court's decision and reiter-
107. See supra notes 64-106 and accompanying text.
108. For example, a Florida statute regarding abandonment provides in pertinent
part: "Abandoned" means a situation in which the parent... while being able,
makes no provision for the child's support and makes no effort to communicate with
the child, which situation is sufficient to evince a willful rejection of parental obliga-
tions. FLA. STAT. § 63.032(14) (1995). See generay DeBoer v. Schmidt, 501 N.W.2d
193, 194 (Mich. Ct. App.) (finding no support for the contention that an unwed bio-
logical father who was not aware of his paternity abandoned his child, and therefore,
his parental rights could not be terminated), odffd, 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993). In
DeBoer, the father was not aware of the birth of his child until more than one
month after the child's birth because he did not know of the pregnancy and the
mother falsely declared another man the father on the birth certificate. Id. at 194.
Once informed of the birth of the child, the father immediately filed an affidavit of
paternity. Id.
109. 543 So. 2d 741 (Fa. 1989).
110. Id. at 747.
111. Id. at 742.
112. Id. at 743.
113. Id. See supra note 108 for Florida's statutory definition of abandonment If the
court finds that the parents have made only "marginal efforts" to provide support and
communicate with the child, the court may declare the child abandoned. Doe, 543 So.
2d at 745.
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ated that a court may examine a father's prebirth actions in determining
whether he has abandoned the child.14
Many courts have followed this same reasoning and have also broad-
ened the language of abandonment statutes by looking at the prebirth
conduct of the unwed biological father in determining whether there was
an abandonment" Courts generally will not permit termination of the
rights of a father who "promptly comes forward and demonstrates a full
commitment to his parental responsibilities"--emotional, financial, and
otherwise."' Yet many courts, like that in Doe v. Roe,"7 hold that this
commitment begins with a father's obligation to provide both financial
and emotional support to an unwed biological mother prior to the birth
of the child. 8 Consequently, in determining whether to terminate the
father's rights, many courts consider the father's prebirth conduct."9
In Adoption of Michael H.,"z the adoptive parents contended that the
court of appeal erred in its application of this standard, known as the
Kelsey S. standard when it upheld the unwed biological father's
rights."' Upon learning of the pregnancy, the unwed biological father
114. Doe, 543 So. 2d at 746. Specifically, the court found that Richard's failure to
provide prebirth financial and emotional assistance to Mary when he had the ability
to do so constituted abandonment. Id. at 743, 749.
115. See, e.g., Adoption of Michael H., 898 P.2d 891, 897 (Cal. 1995) (considering
prebirth actions of the father in deciding to terminate father's rights), cert. denied
sub nom, Mark v. Johns, 116 S. Ct 1272 (1996).
116. Adoption of Kelsey S., 823 P.2d 1216, 1236 (Cal. 1992). The standard applied in
this case, commonly known as the Kelsey S. standard, takes into consideration the
father's prebirth conduct. ld.
117. 543 So. 2d at 741; see supra notes 109-14 and accompanying text (discussing
Doe case).
118. Doe, 543 So. 2d at 746 (holding that prebirth conduct is relevant to the issue
of abandonment); see also In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W., 647 So. 2d 918, 923-24
(Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1994) (finding abandonment when father verbally and emotionally
abused the pregnant mother, failed to attend doctor's appointment made her move
out of their apartment, and failed to provide any support to her during the pregnan-
cy).
119. See Baby E.A.W., 647 So. 2d at 923-24; Baby Girl K ex rel. LK v. B.B., 335
N.W.2d 846, 852 (Wis. 1983) (determining that father's assault of pregnant mother,
attempts to convince expectant mother to smuggle marijuana, and failure to provide
financial or emotional support to pregnant mother supported finding of abandonment).
120. 898 P.2d at 891.
121. Id. at 897; see supra note 116 and accompanying text (setting forth Kelsey S.
standard). The trial court held that it was in the child's best interest to be adopted
by the adoptive parents and consequently terminated Mark's parental rights. Michael
H., 898 P.2d at 893-94. The court of appeal reversed, finding that, under Kelsey S.,
(Mark) suggested that the unwed biological mother (Stephanie) have an
abortion."22 Stephanie refused to have the procedure and instead ar-
ranged for the adoption of her child." During the pregnancy, Mark was
arrested for aggravated assault on Stephanie, and he attempted suicide,
but he agreed to the planned adoption of the child." Yet, after the
child was born, the adoptive parents. and Stephanie learned that Mark
had decided not to place the child up for adoption."2 The Supreme
Court of California exanned these actions and overruled the court of
appeal's decision, stating that the court misinterpreted Kelsey S.126 In
scrutinizing Mark's actions prior to the birth of the child, the court fol-
lowed many other courts and broadened the scope of Kelsey S. to in-
clude prebirth conduct.
127
The variations among courts with respect to the termination of a
father's parental rights upon a finding of abandonment is illustrative of
the subjective nature of this issue. Some courts allow a finding of aban-
donment on the basis of a father's prebirth conduct,"2 considering such
factors as the father's attitude towards the pregnancy and towards any
arrangements for the subsequent placement of the child."2 These fac-
tors are extremely arbitrary and often courts "are moved by natural sym-
pathy in a case," " which compels them to construe the facts in a light
that will support the decision they wish to render.3' The unpredictabili-
Mark's parental rights could not be terminated unless the evidence proved he was an
unfit parent 1d. at 894.
122. Michael H., 898 P.2d at 893.
123. Id.
124. Id,
125. Id. Although Mark appeared to agree to the planned adoption, the evidence
showed that he made arrangements to retain an attorney to seek custody of his child
prior to the child's birth, but failed to inform any of the parties to the adoption of
his change of Intent, Id,
126. Id. at 901.
127. Id. The court specifically held that an unwed biological father has no constitu-
tional right to block an adoption under Kelsey S. "unless he shows that he promptly
came forward and demonstrated as full a commitment to his parental responsibilities
as the biological mother a/lowed and the circumstances permitted within a short
time after he learned or reasonably should have learned that the biological mother
was pregnant with his child." Id. (emphasis added).
128. See, e.g., id.; Doe v. Roe, 543 So. 2d 741, 746 (Fla. 1989).
129. Michael H., 898 P.2d at 893.
130. DeShaney v. Winnebago Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 202-03 (1989) (con-
tending lower court constructed a decision favoring the child on the basis of the
gruesome facts of the case).
131. The Michael H. decision provides an excellent example of a court construing
the facts in order to reach the desired decision. See Michael H., 898 P.2d at 901. In
her concurring opinion, Justice Kennard argued that the majority artfully constructed
its opinion in order to justify its outcome of not removing a four and one-half year
old child from the only home he had ever known. Id. at 906-10 (Kennard, J., con-
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ty stemming from the courts' application of the facts to the law of aban-
donment urgently needs resolution because of its effect on the children
involved."
2. Best Interests of the Child
The primary standard for a court's determination regarding custody of
a child and whether to terminate an unwed biological father's rights was
formerly "the best interests of the child" standard." Modernly, many
jurisdictions continue to apply the best interests of the child standard to
custody disputes."3 In fact, each state's adoption statutes prescribe that
courts use the best interests of the child standard in some form when
maling adoption determinations."
curring).
132. See supra notes 33-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of the urgent
need to resolve this issue.
133. Painter v. Bannister, 140 N.W.2d 152, 156 (Iowa 1966). In Painter, the court
allowed the child to stay with the maternal grandparents with whom he had lived for
two years. Id. at 153. The court stated that "the primary consideration is the best in-
terest of the child and if the return of custody to the father is likely to have a seri-
ously disrupting and disturbing effect upon the child's development, this fact must
prevail." Id. at 156; see also Kouris v. Lunn, 136 N.W.2d 502, 506 (Iowa 1965) (finding
that a young child "would have a better chance in life and would have better rearing
with his [great-aunt] than with his grandmother"); Carrere v. Prunty, 133 N.W.2d 692,
696 (Iowa 1965) (ruling that best interests of the child demanded granting custody to
grandparents because the child had become so "strongly attached to [the]
grandparents' home"); Vanden Heuvel v. Vanden Heuvel, 121 N.W.2d 216, 222-23 (Iowa
1963) (holding that a child of "tender years" was best placed with the mother if
custody with the father meant the father's parents would care for the child and the
father would see the child only on weekends); In re Guardianship of Plucar, 72
N.W.2d 455, 460 (Iowa 1955) (finding that best interests of the child would be served
by granting custody to the child's grandparents because the father left the child with
the grandparents for eight and one-half years); Finken v. Porter, 72 N.W.2d 445, 449
(Iowa 1955) (allowing grandmother and her husband to retain custody of the child
because they had provided excellent care over much of the child's life).
134. See, e.g., Sider v. Sider, 639 A.2d 1076, 1083 (Md. 1994) (stating that court
should consider the best interests of the child in determining paternity petition);
Tubwon v. Weisberg, 394 N.W.2d 601, 604 (Minn. Ct App. 1986) (finding that lower
court's use of best interests of the child standard was not an abuse of discretion);
Paternity of "Adam", 903 P.2d 207, 211 (Mont. 1995) (stating that biological ties are a
weighty, though not controlling, factor in the determination of the best interests of
the child), cert. denied, 116 S. CL 1644 (1996).
135. JoAN H. HOLLNGER Er AL, ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.01(2)(b) (1988).
Over the past twenty years, the book entitled Beyond the Best Inter-
ests of the Child 3 has been instrumental in shaping a framework for
child placement issues resting on the best interests of the child. 37 The
authors based this framework on three principles. First, children must
have continuity in order to develop deep and stable emotional attach-
ments." Second, children have different time perceptions than adults,
and courts must take this into account when determining the time frame
allowed for a change in custody in the life of a child."M Finally, it is dif-
ficult to predict the effect on children caused by removing them from
their stable and loving environments. " Thus, the three fundamental
principles involved in this framework mandate that a child's need for a
speedy and permanent custody determination surpasses the interests of
the competing adults involved in the adoption." ,
Many courts have cited Beyond the Best Interests of the Child in their
determination of custody cases." The factors courts consider in ana-
lyzing what is in the best interests of the child are generally as follows:
(1) [IThe length of time the child has been away from the biological parent; (2)
the age of the child when care was assumed by the third party, (3) the possible
emotional effect on the child of a change of custody, (4) the period of time which
elapsed before the parent sought to reclaim the child; (5) the nature and strength
of the ties between the child and the third party custodian; (6) the intensity and
genuineness of the parent's desire to have the child; and (7) the stability and cer-
tainty as to the child's future in the custody of the parent'
Some jurisdictions have limited the use of the best interests of the
child standard to particular circumstances. For example, California
courts developed this standard by considering whether the biological fa-
ther presents a substantial risk of detriment to the child's well-being.' "
136. GOLDSTEmN r AL., supra note 36.
The three authors of [GOLDSTEIN] are authorities in their particular fields,
though each has on previous occasions applied his specialized knowledge in
collaborations with colleagues in adjacent fields. They are also representatives
of three different institutions, the Yale Law School, the Hampstead Child-
Therapy Clinic, London, and the Child Study Center, Yale University.
Id. at ix.
137. Id. at 53.
138. Id, at 32-33.
139. Id, at 41-42.
140. Id. at 51-52.
141. Id. at 62, 105-11.
142. As of October 2, 1996, 224 federal and state cases have cited BEYOND THE
BEsr INTERESTS OF THE CHILD, including decisions in 38 states plus the District of
Columbia and two United States Supreme Court decisions. Search of WESTLAW,
ALLCASES database (Oct. 2, 1996).
143. Sider v. Sider, 639 A2d 1076, 1086 (Md. 1994) (citing Ross v. Hoffman, 372
A.2d 582 (Md. 1977)).
144. See Orange County Soc. Servs. v. Wendy H., 862 P.2d 751, 764-65 (Cal. 1993)
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Within California, however, some courts have held that the best interests
of the child standard should no longer be the primary consideration in
the determination of whether the court should terminate an unwed bio-
logical father's rights." The discrepancy regarding the applicable stan-
dard even within the same jurisdiction exemplifies the unpredictability
involved in these decisions.
In Paternity of 'Adam, '1 the Montana Supreme Court used the best
interests of the child standard to decide that the termination of an un-
wed biological father's (Bob) parental rights was proper.4 Bob and the
unwed biological mother (Mary) ended their relationship before Mary
iealized she was pregnant." Mary subsequently married another man
(John), and Mary and John requested that Bob relinquish his parental
rights."e Bob refused, but Mary listed John as the father on the birth
certificate.'" The court looked to decisions of other state courts to de-
termine whether the best interests of the child standard was ap-
plicable.' The court contrasted the "stability of the family relationship
of Mary and John" with "Bob's failure to show any commitment towards
establishing a 'parental' as opposed to a biological role" and held that it
was not in the best interests of the child to protect Bob's parental
rights.6 2
(considering biological father's incarceration, drug use, and lack of a plan to care for
child in determining that the father posed substantial risk of detriment to child).
145. San Diego County Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Edward M., 688 P.2d 918, 921 (Cal.
1984). The court determined that it could not terminate the father's rights based
sole/y on the best interests of the child standard. Id. at 919-20.
146. 903 P.2d 207 (Mont 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1544 (1996).
147. Id. at 211.
148. Id. at 208.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 210. The court noted that California courts have held "that even if a pu-
tative father establishes his biological paternity to a child conceived out of wedlock,
but born after the mother married another man, the nature of his relationship to the
child is governed by the best interest of the child." Id, The court further noted that
Washington courts, on the other hand, have held that "[t]he best interest of the child
standard does not entitle a court to presume that paternity determination is automat-
icaUy in the child's best interest.'" Id. (quoting McDaniels v. Carlson, 738 P.2d 254,
261 (Wash. 1987)).
152. Id. at 211. The court found that "Bob . . . had no contact with [the child] and
[had] demonstrated no personal commitment to or responsibility for [the child); nor
[had] he taken steps to obtain suitable employment or housing or to establish a child
support fund." Id,
Whether a jurisdiction continues to use the best interests of the child
standard as the primary focus" or applies a modified version of the
standard,154 every jurisdiction implements the best interests of the child
to some degree in rendering a decision in an adoption proceeding.'"
The various best interests of the child standards and their varied applica-
tion further demonstrate the great degree of uncertainty plaguing adop-
tions involving an unwed biological father and also illustrate the urgent
need for resolution."M
3. Nature of the Relationship Between Parent and Child
Many jurisdictions determine whether to terminate an unwed biologi-
cal father's rights by evaluating the nature of the existing parent-child
relationship. Several jurisdictions protect a father's rights if he has dem-
onstrated a commitment to parent his child.'57
In In re J.W.T.," an unwed biological father (Larry) argued that the
court violated his constitutional rights by denying him the opportunity to
establish his paternity.? The biological mother (Judy) conceived a
child while she lived with Larry." The couple planned to marry after
153. See, e.g., Sider v. Sider, 639 A.2d 1076, 1083 (Md. 1994).
154. See, e.g., Orange County Soc. Serv& v. Wendy H., 862 P.2d 751, 764-65 (Cal
1993).
155. HOLUN0 Gr ETAL, supra note 135, at § 1.01(2)(b).
156. See supra notes 33-52 and accompanying text (discussing urgent need to re-
solve this issue).
157. For example, Texas protects the rights of a father who "1) acknowledges re-
sponsibility for child support or other care and maintenance, and 2) makes serious
and continuous efforts to establish a relationship with the child." In re J.W.T., 872
S.W.2d 189, 195 ('Tex. 1994). Oklahoma grants standing to assert parental rights to fa-
thers who have actually committed themselves to establishing a relationship with
their child, as evidenced by the father's assumption of parental duties. Adoption of
Baby Boy D, 742 P.2d 1059, 1068 (Okia 1985) (holding that the father's failure to
provide emotional or financial support to the biological mother during her pregnancy
demonstrated his lack of commitment toward parenthood). New York allows termina-
tion of the rights of a father who fails to establish a custodial relationship with his
child. Robert 0. v. Russell K, 173 A.D.2d 30, 35 (N.Y. 1992) (ruling that a father's
rights could be terminated although he did not know of the pregnancy until after his
child was placed for adoption). Florida permits termination of the rights of a father
who fails to assume the responsibilities of parenthood. In re Adoption of Baby
E.A.W., 647 So. 2d 918, 923-24 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1994) (considering father's verbal
and physical abuse of pregnant mother and failure to provide prebirth financial assis-
tance or attend prebirth medical examinations with expectant mother as evidence of
a lack of parental responsibility).
158. 872 S.W.2d at 189.
159. Id. at 191.
160. Id. at 189.
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Judy's divorce from her husband was final. 1 Larry and Judy arranged
for prenatal care and Larry paid for several of Judy's medical expens-
es.' Judy and her husband reconciled prior to the birth of the child,
and Larry quickly filed suit declaring paternity and seeking visitation2
The court held that Larry's constitutional rights were violated because he
had been "arbitrarily prevented from attempting to establish any relation-
ship with his natural child, after making early and unqualified acceptance
of parental duties. ""' This case exemplifies the use of the nature of the
relationship between an unwed biological father and his child as an indi-
cation of whether the relationship is worthy of constitutional protection.
As discussed above, jurisdictions apply different standards to deter-
mine the nature of the rights afforded or denied an unwed biological fa-
ther." Hence, it is difficult to predict the outcome when a court de-
cides a child's custody placement in an adoption case, and fathers often
rest their constitutional claims on that basis.'" Thus, states must con-
solidate these divergent approaches into one uniform regulation that en-
sures a certain result in each adoption proceeding."6
IV. PROPOSALS FOR PROVIDING CERTAINTY TO THIS CRITICAL ISSUE
There are three important areas in which modification would provide
certainty to the rights afforded to unwed biological fathers: (1) state
ratification of pertinent sections of the Uniform Adoption Act," (2)
state legislation creating strict guidelines and time constraints," and
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id
164. Id. at 198. A Texas statute prevented Larry from asserting his paternity be-
cause it provided that "[i]f, when a child is born, the mother is married to someone
other than the biological father, her husband is 'presumed' to be the child's actual
father, and this 'marital presumption' may not be attacked by any party outside the
marriage.. . ." Id, at 190.
165. -See supra notes 108-64 and accompanying text (examining various jurisdictional
approaches to this issue).
166. See supra notes 64-107 and accompanying text (analyzing constitutional claims
made by unwed biological fathers).
167. See itfra notes 168-220 and accompanying text (outlining proposals that will
provide the uniformity necessary to protect the interests of children in adoption cas-
es).
168. See infz notes 173-91 and accompanying text
169. See infra notes 192-97 and accompanying text.
(3) recognition of due process rights for children.17 Adoption of either
the Uniform Adoption Act or comparable state legislation would assure a
predictable outcome in every adoption case.'71 Recognition of a child's
due process rights would ensure that in the unfortunate event the speci-
ficity of the new legislation nevertheless occasionally allowed a child to
be caught in a legal limbo, the child would have a constitutional right to
the protection of existing familial relationships." I
A. Uniform Adoption Act
The National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws
adopted the Revised Uniform Adoption Act (UAA) at their 1994 Annual
Meeting." The UAA attempts to eliminate the confusion in adoption
proceedings involving unwed biological fathers.174 The UAA weighs the
importance of the interests of all the parties to an adoption and focuses
primarily on the best interests of the child. 7' The UAA creates certain
guidelines by combining the two prevalent standards in adoption: (1) a
showing of abandonment of the child,17 and (2) a showing that termi-
nation of the father's parental rights is in the best interests of the
child.17
Specifically, the UAA allows for termination of an unwed biological
father's rights if (1) he fails to respond to a petition served upon him
within twenty days, and (2) the court finds it is in the best interests of
the child to terminate the relationship and he fails to comply with certain
responsibilities imposed upon him." Furthermore, the UAA bars a fa-
170. See infra notes 198-220 and accompanying text.
171. See infra notes 173-97 and accompanying text.
172. See infra notes 198-220 and accompanying text.
173. UNw. ADOPrION AcT (1994), 9 U.LA. 1 (Supp. 1996) (Historical Note).
174. See Images of Adoption, supra note 6, at B3 (explaining that the purpose of
the UAA is to overcome the confusion and conflict among existing state laws).
175. See Maija E. Selmann, For the Sake of the Child- Moving Toward Uniformity
in Adoption Law, 69 WASH. L REV. 841, 852 (1994) (recommending adoption of UAA
provisions regarding consent procedures, racial matching, and open adoption).
176. The UAA specifies the precise actions which, if an unwed biological father fails
to take, will constitute abandonment of the child. See infra note 178 (listing circum-
stances in which parental rights will be terminated under UAA). The current handling
of abandonment varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. See supra notes 108-32 and
accompanying text (discussing various state approaches to abandonment).
177. The UAA provides time constraints on the period in which a change of custo-
dy will be allowed in order to serve the best interests of the child by ensuring his
psychological stability. See infra notes 178-87 and accompanying text (outlining the
procedures specified in the UAA). The best interests of the child standard currently
employed by courts differs vastly among jurisdictions. See supra notes 133-56 and
accompanying text (examining various state approaches to the standard).
178. UNIF. ADOFTION Acr § 3-504, 9 U.LA. 52.
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ther from blocking an adoption when he knows of the biological
mother's pregnancy but fails to demonstrate a substantial commitment to
the child."7 If this occurs, the father has essentially abandoned the
child."8' For example, the UAA unifies the various state abandonment
statutes into one standard that allows the court to declare that a father
abandoned his child if he (1) failed to pay for medical care for the ex-
pectant mother and newborn child,18" ' (2) did not provide reasonable
and consistent financial support to the child,"S (3) failed to visit the
child regularly," and (4) lacked the desire to physically take the child
into his custody.' The UAA also establishes firm procedures for the
Section 3-604 allows for termination of parental rights in the following instances:
(a) U1 the respondent is served with a petition to terminate under this
[part) and the accompanying notice and does not respond and, in the case of
an alleged father, file a claim of paternity within 20 days after the service
unless a claim of paternity is pending, the court shall order the termination
of any relationship of parent and child between the respondent and the mi-
nor unless the proceeding for adoption is dismissed.
(c) If the respondent responds and asserts parental rights, the court
shall proceed with the hearing expeditiously. If the court finds, upon clear
and convincing evidence, that one of the following grounds exists, and, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that termination is in the best interest of the
minor, the court shall terminate any relationship of parent and child between
the respondent and the minor
(1) in the case of a minor who has not attained six months of age at
the time the petition for adoption is filed, unless the respondent proves by a
preponderance of the evidence a compelling reason for not complying with
this paragraph, the respondent has failed to:
(i) pay reasonable prenatal, natal, and postnatal expenses in
accordance with the respondent's financial means;
(ii) make reasonable and consistent payments, in accor-
dance with the respondent's financial means, for the support of the minor,
(iii) visit regularly with the minor, and
(iv) manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and
physical custody of the minor, if, during this time, the minor was not in the
physical custody of the other parent.
Id,
Section 3-604 also makes special provisions for a child who has reached the age
of six months. See id, § 3-504(c)(2).
179. Id. § 2-401, 9 U.LA. 46.
180. Id.
181. Id, § 3-504(c)(1)Ci), 9 U.LA. 52.
182. Id. § 3-04(c)(1)(ii), 9 U.LA. 52.
183. Id. § 3-504(c)(1)Cii), 9 U.LA. 52.
184. Id. § 3-504(c)(1)Civ), 9 U.LA. 52.
time allowed for demonstration of a commitment," specifications for
the content of the consent,M and requirements for attempting to set
aside the consent.'
Thus, the UAA delineates with relative certainty the rights and obliga-
tions of unwed biological fathers. Yet, to date, only eight states have
specifically adopted the UAA.118 Adoption of the UAA is important be-
cause it would provide uniformity to the varying methods of weighing
the interests of the parties involved in an adoption."
The UAA provides the swift determination of custody that the child
needs to ensure stable development and, further, provides safeguards to
protect the interests of the unwed biological fathers."M State adoption
of the UAA will produce predictable results in each adoption proceeding,
and the greatest benefit of this uniformity will be the protection extend-
ed to a child by minimizing the amount of time allowed for a change of
custody.101
B. Other Legislation
While the UAA would provide certainty and structure, many states
have already proposed or adopted their own original legislation in an
attempt to bring certainty to this issue.
1. Proposals
Several states have pending legislation which purports to "prevent
occurrences... of the 'Baby Jessica' case."" For example, in Arizona,
the legislature proposed a bill that would require unwed biological moth-
ers to list all potential fathers.M Under this legislation, if the father
fails to file an affidavit declaring whether he intends to assert parental
rights within thirty days of notification of his potential paternity, he
185. Id. § 2-404, 9 U.LA. 30 (limiting the time frame to 192 hours after birth).
186. Id. § 2-406, 9 U.LA. 33.
187. Id. § 2-408, 9 U.LA. 35 (allowing court to set aside consent only upon notice
to the adoptive parents within 192 hours of the birth of the child).
188. These states include Alabama, Arkansas, California, Louisiana, Montana, North
Dakota, Ohio, and Oklahoma.
189. HOLUNGEJ Er AL., supra note 135, § 1.01(1).
190. For example, the UAA does not allow parents to consent to an adoption prior
to the birth of the child. UNW. ADOPION ACT § 2-404(a), 9 U.LA. 30. Furthermore,
the UAA allows parents to revoke consent at any time prior to the finalization of the
adoption upon a showing of fraud or duress. Id. § 2-408(b)(1), 9 U.LA. 35.
191. See id. § 2-404, 9 U.LA. 30.
192. House Panel Endorses Measure to Prevent 'Baby Jessica' Cases, AR. REPUB-
LIC, Feb. 3, 1994, at B2.
193. Id.
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would lose the opportunity to block the adoption." Similarly, the Cali-
fornia Assembly passed a bill that reduces the time period for birth par-
ents to change their minds about an adoption from ninety to thirty days
and reduces the time limit in which the birth parents may attack a final-
ized adoption to six months."
2. Enactments
In response to the uncertainty regarding the rights and responsibilities
of unwed biological fathers, several states enacted legislation aimed spe-
cifically at clarifying these two issues. Iowa, for example, established a
paternity registry for fathers that ensures they receive notice if their
child is placed for adoption." Additionally, California passed legislation
that specifies the particular instances when and the precise parties who
may bring an action to determine whether a father and child relationship
exists. 
197
194. Id,
195. California Adoption Barrier Reform Package, Assembly Bill 2165 (Aug. 28,
1996).
196. IOWA CODE § 144.12A (Supp. 1996).
197. CAL FAit CODE § 7630 (West 1994).
Section 7630 provides:
(a) A child, the child's natural mother, or a man presumed to be the
child's father under subdivision (a), (b), or (c) of Section 7611, may bring an
action as follows:
(1) At any time for the purpose of declaring the existence of the
father and child relationship presumed under subdivision (a), (b), or (c) of
Section 7611.
(2) For the purpose of declaring the nonexistence of the father and
child relationship presumed under subdivision (a), (b), or (c) of Section 7611
only if the action is brought within a reasonable time after obtaining knowl-
edge of relevant facts. After the presumption has been rebutted, paternity of
the child by another man may be determined in the same action, if he has
been made a party.
(b) Any interested party may bring an action at any time for the pur-
pose of determining the existence or nonexistence of the father and child
relationship presumed under subdivision (d) of Section 7611.
(c) An action to determine the existence of the father and child rela-
tionship with respect to a child who has no presumed father under Section
7611 or whose presumed father is deceased may be brought by the child or
personal representative of the child, the State Department of Social Services,
the mother or the personal representative or a parent of the mother if the
mother has died or is a minor, a man alleged or alleging himself to be the
father, or the personal representative or a parent of the alleged father if the
Although these state attempts to draft legislation to provide certainty
to the decisions affecting a change in custody coincide with the provi-
sions of the UAA, state ratification of the UAA would grant even more
protection to the interested parties than the individual legislative at-
tempts. The individual legislative attempts, however, are a viable alterna-
tive to adoption of the UAA.
C. Possible Constitutional Due Process Rights for Children
The recognition of constitutional due process rights for children, taken
with the provisions of the UAA and other legislative enactments, would
further protect the interests of children. "An important part of affording
due process rights to children is to give them a voice in their own life
decisions."" Removal from the only home that a child has ever known
is a life decision in which the child should certainly have a voice. Courts
recognize that a child will suffer psychological harm when taken from a
stable environment and placed in a new home." Yet, courts render
their decisions based on the fathers' constitutional rights and ignore the
impact that their decisions will have on the children." Children, how-
ever, must also be afforded a constitutional right to due process because
of the psychological damage they may suffer as a result of a change in
custody."1 Although the Supreme Court has never directly addressed
this issue,' it nevertheless warrants consideration.
Children are unable to speak for themselves, and as a result, they are
unable to assert the legal rights and make the legal demands adults in
the same situations would certainly claim." This problem generally
alleged father has died or is a minor.
Id.; see also id, § 7664 (defining specific situations in which a court may terminate an
unwed biological father's parental rights).
198. Richard E. Redding, Children's Competence to Provide Iformed Consent for
Mental Health Treatment, 50 WASH. & LE L REv. 695, 749 (1993) (discussing "the
importance of recognizing the personhood of children").
199. Michael U. v. Jamie B., 705 P.2d 362, 367 n.7 (Cal. 1985).
200. Adoption of Kelsey S., 823 P.2d 1216, 1236 (Cal. 1992) (finding that the "child's
well-being is presumptively best served by continuation of the father's parental rela-
tionship").
201. Scarnecchia, supra note 3, at 42.
202. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 130 (1989) ("We have never had occa-
sion to decide whether a child has a liberty interest, symmetrical with that of her
parent, in maintaining her filial relationship. We need not do so here because, even
assuming that such a right exists, [the child's] claim must fail."). In addition, state su-
preme courts have yet to address this issue. Adoption of Michael H., 898 P.2d 891,
893-94 (Cal. 1995), cert. denied sub nom., Mark v. Johns, 116 S. Ct. 1272 (1996). The
Michael H. court did not consider the Fourteenth Amendment "interests of children
in the stability and continuity of their family lives" because the consideration was not
essential to its decision and the parties did not raise the issue at the trial level. Id.
203. In re Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649, 689 (Mich. 1993) (Levin, J., dissenting). Justice
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arises when a court orders the change of a child's custody after deter-
mining that an unwed biological father was denied his constitutional
right to care for his child.2'4 The Due Process Clause established by the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution does not apply
only to adults.'n Just as unwed biological fathers claim their parental
rights should not be terminated absent a substantial state interest,'
children should also be able to claim that their relationships with their
established families deserve constitutional protection and likewise should
not be terminated without a substantial reason.W
Historically, courts have specifically afforded children many constitu-
tional rights.' For example, in Plyler v. Doe," Mexican children ar-
gued that a Texas statute denied them equal protection because it al-
lowed schools to deny education to children who were not "legally ad-
mitted" into the country.20 The Court held that the statute violated the
Levin wrote:
If the danger confronting this child were physical injury, no one would
question her right to invoke judicial process to protect herself against such
injury. There is little difference, when viewed from the child's frame of refer-
ence, between a physical assault and a psychological assault ... . It is only
because this child cannot speak for herself that adults can avert their eyes
from the pain that she will suffer.
Id (Levin, J., dissenting).
204. See, e.g., In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239, 245-46 (Iowa 1992) (finding that the
termination of parental rights requires more than regard for the best interests of the
child).
205. The Due Process Clause guarantees that a person shall be free from govern-
mental interference. U.S. CONST. amend. XV. (emphasis added); see aLso Planned Par-
enthood of Cent Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (stating that "constitutional
rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state-
defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution
and possess constitutional rights."); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967) (holding that
"neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone").
206. See supra notes 53-107 and accompanying text (examining due process and
equal protection claims of unwed biological fathers).
207. See Scarnecchia, supra note 3, at 54-55.
208. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 693 (1977) (granting
children privacy rights); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 506-07 (1969) (bestowing freedom of speech rights on children); In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1, 30-31 (1967) (giving procedural due process rights to children in criminal
juvenile proceedings); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (establishing
equal protection rights for children).
209. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
210. Id at 205.
children's equal protection rights."' The Court reasoned that the Mexi-
can children were "persons" and therefore protected under the Equal
Protection Clause which provides that "'[n]o State shall ... deny to any
person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws. 9 2 12 Apply-
ing Plyler's reasoning to the case of removing children from their stable
homes, these children are also persons and therefore protected under the
Due Process Clause.213 Just as the Court held that the Mexican children
had a right to protect their "social, economic, intellectual, and psycho-
logical well-being,"214 children who face damage to their psychological
well-being because a court removes them from stable families also de-
serve constitutional protection.
In maling such constitutional decisions on behalf of children facing
removal from their homes, courts should consider the same factors previ-
ously widely recognized in best interest of the child determinations.2 '
Those factors are:
(1) [Tihe length of time the child has been away from the biological parent; (2)
the age of the child when care was assumed by the third party; (3) the possible
emotional effect on the child of a change of custody, (4) the period of time which
elapsed before the parent sought to reclaim the child; (5) the nature and strength
of the ties between the child and the third party custodian; (6) the intensity and
genuineness of the parent's desire to have the child; and (7) the stability and cer-
tainty as to the child's future in the custody of the parent 2 '
Currently, although courts consider the father's constitutional claims,
they only contemplate the impact on the child upon a determination that
the father is an unfit parent.2 7 Yet, because children suffer serious psy-
chological damage when a court removes them from the only caregivers
they have ever known,218 courts must afford these children the same
due process rights as unwed biological fathers in order to eliminate this
disruption in the children's developmental growth.21
211. Id. at 210.
212. Id, (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1) (emphasis in original).
213. See id,; Redding, supra note 198, at 749-50 (discussing argument favoring due
process rights for children); Lisa Marie Sunderman, The Institutionalized Child's
Right to Counse. Satiqfying Due Process Requiements Through the Protection and
Advocacy for Mentally Ill Individuals Act, 23 VAL U. L REV. 629, 635-39 (1989)
(same); see also Raymond C. O%rien, An Analysis of Realistic Due Process Rights of
Children Versus Parents, 26 CoNN. L REv. 1209, 1247-52 (1994) (same).
214. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 222-23.
215. Sider v. Sider, 639 A.2d 1076, 1086 (Md. 1994).
216. Id. (citing Ross. v. Hoffman, 372 A.2d 582 (Mass. 1977)).
217. In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W., 647 So. 2d 918, 925 (Fla Dist Ct. App. 1994)
(Pariente, J., concurring) (recognizing court's inability to consider impact on the child
despite the fact that "the record in this case [indicates] that the child may possibly
suffer serious psychological damage upon being removed from the only home she has
ever known").
218. GoLSrmN ET AL, supra note 36, at 32-33.
219. Scarnecchia, supra note 3, at 61.
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The provisions of the UAA, the goals motivating states to draft and
enact protective legislation, and the arguments favoring a recognition of
constitutional due process rights for children all provide a means to the
same end: protecting the child by minimizing the delay in permanent
placement of the child in an adoption proceeding.' °
V. CONCLUSION
"By uniformly implementing the proposed solution, courts will protect
the rights of biological fathers, adoptive parents and especially the chil-
dren caught in the middle of these disputes.""1
The ambiguity regarding the rights bestowed upon unwed biological
fathers is detrimental to all parties involved in an adoption. As a result of
this uncertainty, Baby Jessica and many other children like her lose the
stability of the only family they have ever known.' Currently, each ju-
risdiction applies a different test to determine the rights of an unwed
biological father, and this creates a legal dilemmaus with traumatic re-
sults for a child involved in a contested adoption proceeding.'s
Scarnecchia presents a suggested argument to the United States Supreme Court
on behalf of recognizing a child's due process rights. Id. at 48-61. The argument con-
cludes:
The child should not be the prize granted to the winner of the litigation. He
is a person with the right to have his personhood meaningfully considered by
any court with the power to change his life forever. Therefore, [the child] re-
spectfully requests remand to the trial court for a hearing to balance his
rights against the rights and interests of his biological father to determine
whether or not the adoption should be granted. If the adoption is denied,
(the child] respectfully requests a hearing to determine legal custody (short of
adoption), again balancing his rights and interests with those of his biological
father.
Id, at 61.
220. See Seinann, supra note 175, at 857.
221. Lynn Kirsch, Unwed Fathers and Their Newborn Children Placed for Adoption:
Protecting the Rights of Both in Custody Disputes, 36 ARZ L REV. 1011, 1012
C1994).
222. See DeBoer v. Schmidt, 501 N.W.2d 193 (Mich. Ct App.), afd, 502 N.W.2d 649
(Mich. 1993).
223. See supra notes 108-67 and accompanying text (discussing the jurisdictional
variances in deciding the rights granted to unwed biological fathers).
224. GOLDSTUN ur AL, supra note 36 and accompanying text (describing the psy-
chological damage suffered by a child whose stable development is disrupted by a
change in custody).
This Comment proposes that every state ratify the Uniform Adoption
Act. The Uniform Adoption Act offers the best solution by furnishing the
uniformity necessary to provide predictable and efficient results in adop-
tion proceedings involving an unwed biological father. This predictability
and efficiency is essential to the well-being of every child. Individual
state legislative efforts have the correct goal in mind-specific guidelines
for courts to follow in making decisions regarding an unwed biological
father's role in the life of his child. Yet, the children's need for continuity
remains the same regardless of the state in which they reside, and there-
fore, their interests must be uniformly protected throughout the nation.
Granting children constitutional due process rights and having consistent
state ratification of the Uniform Adoption Act will further protect chil-
dren by constitutionally protecting their interest in retaining the stability
of their current family and by shielding them from the unnecessary psy-
chological harm that would ensue if they were removed from the only
home they have ever known.
Uniformity is the key to providing the predictable results essential in
the adoption of a child. Changes in the placement of a child are detri-
mental to a child's stability and must not be allowed arbitrarily. There-
fore, each state must adopt the Uniform Adoption Act, and the courts
must recognize a child's constitutionally protected right to a relationship
with his established family.' Not until certainty in the rights afforded
to unwed biological fathers is provided will the horrors of children, like
Baby Jessica, screaming as they are tom from their families, come to an
end.
TRACY CASHMAN
225. Baby Jessica's situation provides an excellent example of how these reforms
would furnish the necessary certainty. While the specific statutory language would not
have applied to Jessica's father because he was unaware of the child's existence until
one month after the mother relinquished custody of Jessica, judicial recognition of
Jessica's due process rights would have afforded her a hearing to determine whether
she should be removed from her stable home. Under such an analysis, the court
would have likely decided that Jessica had a right to be protected from the psycho-
logical damage she ultimately suffered as a result of being removed from her home.
See supra note 2 for a discussion of Baby Jessica's case.
